Introduction and motivation
Global financial market conditions deteriorated sharply in the summer of 2007, triggered by concerns about exposures of financial institutions to the most risky segment of the US mortgage markets the so-called subprime mortgage market and related financial instruments. 1 As risk assessments were adjusted, the financial turmoil spilled over to other financial market segments and risky assets particularly those linked to structured finance were abandoned in favor of "safe haven" instruments such as government debt securities.
Across the globe, stock prices fell, volatility levels jumped, credit spreads increased sharply and liquidity demand surged, prompting central banks to inject substantial amounts of additional liquidity into the markets. Uncertainly was particularly pronounced in the short-term money markets, as evidenced by a marked increase in risk aversion in the asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) market and rather unprecedented rises in interbank money market interest rates. At the same time, the markets for the transfer of credit risk were affected as well, and the costs of credit protection increased markedly, particularly for specific sectors such as banks and other financial institutions. Although individual countries and specific market segments were affected to different extents, the scope of the financial market turmoil was truly global and discrimination by market participants among individual borrowers was uneven or nonexistent.
The financial market turmoil continued to develop into 2008, partly driven by losses that were actually reported by various large international banks and which were generally either larger or much larger than had been anticipated, and partly by information indicating further deteriorating conditions in US housing and (subprime) mortgage markets. In this respect, the liquidity concerns that dominated the initial phase of the turmoil were accompanied increasingly by credit risk concerns and what had started as a liquidity crisis seemed to develop more into a crisis of solvency related to major financial institutions.
After the implementation of major new policy measures in the course of March 2008, particularly in the United States, some sense of normalization returned to global financial markets, but uncertainty in various market segments in particular of the credit and structured finance markets remained at elevated levels.
There is broad consensus that structured finance played an important role in the development and propagation of the financial turmoil. For example, the IMF has concluded that "… the proliferation of new complex structured finance products, markets, and business models exposed the financial system to a funding disruption and a breakdown in confidence"
and that certain structured finance products "… likely exacerbated the depth and duration of the crisis by adding uncertainty relating to their valuation as the underlying fundamentals deteriorated" [IMF (2008a) ].
The financial turmoil revealed a number of weaknesses related to the use of structured finance which can be summarized as follows. In numerous cases, banks underestimated their exposures to structured finance products and to specific
1. More formally defined, according to Kiff and Mills (2007) , p.3, subprime mortgages are residential loans that do not conform to the criteria for "prime" mortgages and so have a lower expected probability of full repayment, as they are made to more "risky" mortgage borrowers. This assessment is made according to objective criteria such as the borrower's credit score and record and loan-to-value ratios. An elaborate discussion of the sub-prime mortgage market is beyond the scope of this paper. An excellent overview is presented in the aforementioned publication.
"off-balance sheet" vehicles which play an important role in this type of finance. Moreover, certain banks invested heavily in structured finance products, with retaining large exposures to specific structured finance instruments such as collateralized debt obligations, but without understanding sufficiently their impact on the banks' capital and liquidity positions. In addition, in recent years banks in general resorted to more volatile funding sources including structured finance products. When the financial turmoil hit and structured credit markets came to a virtual standstill, the funding capability of specific banks such as Northern Rock in the UK was impaired significantly. Furthermore, many of the globally operating banks had offered liquidity standby facilities to "off-balance sheet" vehicles engaged in structured finance, but generally underestimated the liquidity risk arising from off-balance sheet exposures. Finally, the financial turmoil has raised concerns that the process of securitization may have generated unwelcome incentive problems, in the sense that banks may not assess the credit risk of specific borrowers accurately as they put these loans off the balance sheet anyway through securitization techniques.
The aim of this Occasional Paper is to provide an introductory overview of structured finance, so that the reader may better understand its role and importance in the financial turmoil of 2007-2008, such as briefly described above. Thus, this publication serves as a background document which may be useful in providing rather specialized knowledge that is required to be able to comprehend recent developments in global financial markets, in particular the financial turmoil. Structured finance has developed very fast in recent years and often involves highly complex financial instruments and techniques, which may not be understood completely beyond a small circle of financial market experts. In this sense, the overview pays attention to the most relevant instruments of structured finance such as asset-backed securities and collateralized debt obligations and techniques such as securitization. In addition, the Occasional Paper provides a concise analysis of the most important channels linking specific structured finance instruments to the financial turmoil.
At the same time, the aim of this paper is not to provide an in-depth analysis of the financial turmoil, of which excellent studies exist [for example: IMF (2008a and ; ECB (2008b); BIS (2008c); Borio (2008) ].
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of structured finance and discusses its specific characteristics. It also presents a detailed classification of structured finance instruments that serves as a basis for the rest of the Occasional
Paper. Furthermore, it is explained that a number of structured finance instruments such as mortgage-backed securities (MBS), asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) have been at the centre of the financial turmoil, whereas other instruments such as credit default swaps (CDS) have been more monitoring devices to assess the development of the financial turmoil. Section 3 pays attention to securitization and to the aforementioned specific structured finance instruments that played an important role in the financial turmoil: MBS (section 3.1), ABCP (section 3.2) and (cash-flow) CDOs (section 3.3). Section 4 sets out the main characteristics of credit derivatives, in particular credit default swaps (CDS) (section 4.1) and synthetic CDOs (section 4.2). Section 5 concludes and analyses the main channels through which structured finance instruments contributed to the initiation and propagation of the financial turmoil.
Structured finance
Structured finance relates to a group of complex financial instruments and mechanisms that defers a simple universal definition, but broadly defined it could be described as referring to the repackaging of cash flows that can transform the risk, return and liquidity characteristics of financial portfolios [Issing (2005) ; Fabozzi et al. (2006) ]. A more straightforward interpretation is provided in BIS (2005a) , where structured finance is defined as a form of financial intermediation which is based on securitization technology:
Structured finance "… involves the pooling of assets and the subsequent sale to investors of claims on the cash flows backed by these pools. Typically, several classes (or "tranches") of securities are issued, each with distinct risk-return profiles". This definition clearly involves the elements of a) pooling of assets (either cash-based or synthetically created by using credit default swaps) and b) the tranching of liabilities that are backed by the asset pool. In addition, c) the credit risk of the collateral asset pool is separated from the credit risk of the originator, through the involvement of a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV) or Special Purpose Entity (SPE) [Gorton and Souleles (2005) ]. These specific characteristics will be explained in the subsequent sections.
In structured finance, rating agencies play a crucial role. These agencies, such as As has become clear from the introduction above, structured finance is strongly interrelated with securitization. According to Fabozzi and Kothari (2007) , structured finance, in a narrow sense, is used almost interchangeably with securitization [see also:
The Economist (2008); Blundell-Wignall (2007a and 2007b); Citigroup (2007) ]. Traditionally, securitization can be defined as the pooling of financial assets, such as for example residential mortgages, and their subsequent sale (of either the assets themselves or only their credit risk)
by the originator to a SPV, which then issues debt securities known as asset-backed securities (ABS) for sale to investors. The principal and the interest of the ABS issued by the SPV depend on the cash-flows produced by the pool of underlying financial assets (such as residential mortgages) [ECB (2008a) ]. In different words, securitization can also be interpreted as a financing mechanism, or a process in which assets are refinanced in the capital markets by issuing securities sold to investors by a SPV [Vink and Thibeault (2007) ].
Securitizations can be conducted basically in two ways. First, in a so-called true sale securitization, the underlying assets are indeed actually sold by the originator to the SPV and thus removed from the balance sheet of the originator (for example a bank). Second, in a socalled synthetic securitization, the underlying assets remain on the balance sheet of the originator, and only the credit risk of the underlying assets is transferred to the SPV by buying credit derivatives such as credit default swaps over this assets [ECB (2008a) ].
Securitization is closely linked to the so-called "originate-to-distribute" model. Under this model, the bank that originates the assets (basically loans) puts them off its balance sheet through securitization and thus "distributes" them to the SPV and the ultimate investors who buy the ABS issued by the SPV. This model and securitization have major advantages for the banks involved, as they can free up capital and liquidity by not holding the loans on their balance sheets. As the same time, since the bank knows that it is going to put loans off its balance sheet, it may not apply the same strict credit risk assessment as it would conduct otherwise (incentive or moral hazard problems).
Figure 1 provides an overview of the main structured finance instruments.
In essence, these instruments can be divided in securitizations and credit derivatives.
Securitizations consist of short-term asset backed securities (short-term ABS, predominantly asset-backed commercial paper or ABCP) and longer-term asset-backed securities (term ABS), defined from a broad perspective. Broadly defined asset-backed securities include three main categories: Mortgage-backed securities (MBS), asset-backed securities in a narrow sense (ABS, which are basically collateralized by all kinds of assets except mortgages, such as car loans, student loans, etc.) and "cash flow" collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) [Jobst (2003 and ; Vink and Thibeault (2007) ]. In market practice, often when the term asset-backed securities or the abbreviation ABS is used, the narrow interpretation is followed, thus implying asset-backed securities (ABS) with the important exception of mortgagebacked securities (MBS) and "cash flow" CDOs. Paper, synthetic CDOs are included in "pure" credit derivatives (see Figure 1 ), which are not based particularly on securitization techniques, but are much more very specific instruments to transfer credit risk from one party to another. The classification of synthetic CDOs as "pure" credit derivatives is also done mainly in order to follow statistical market practices.
For example, the credit derivatives statistics published by the BBA include only synthetic CDOs and not "cash flow" CDOs. The most important instruments belonging to "pure" credit derivatives are credit default swaps (CDS), with other instruments here are, in addition to synthetic CDOs, credit-linked notes, total return swaps and credit spread options. These latter three instruments will not be discussed.
In relation to the financial turmoil of 2007-2008, different groups of structured finance instruments played different roles. First, a number of these instruments were at the heart of the financial market tensions, as due to uncertainties about their valuations and exposures to the US (subprime) mortgage markets, investors started to shun them en masse.
Subsequently, these tensions spilled over to other segments of the credit markets, other financial markets such as the equity and foreign exchange markets and the financial services industry, in particular (investment) banks which significant exposures to these instruments.
The structured finance instruments involved in this process were in particular (subprime) residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS), asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP) and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), including both "cash flow" and "synthetic" CDOs.
Second, certain structured finance instruments were involved only indirectly in the turmoil, but provided very useful information on the development of the financial market tensions. This applies particularly to credit default swaps (CDS). These financial contracts have been instrumental in monitoring pressures in specific market segments through CDS index contracts, which are representative for a group of companies, as well as uncertainties about the soundness and viability of individual commercial and investment banks and insurance companies through single name CDS contracts. Both groups of structured finance instruments related to the financial turmoil will be discussed in the subsequent sections. An example of the securitization of residential mortgages, which involves the creation of RMBS and is based on the "true" sale of the mortgage pool to the SPV, is shown in Figure 2 . A bank provides mortgage loans to various homeowners A, B, etc., and puts these mortgages together in a pool of many mortgages. Subsequently, this bank that has "originated" these loans, sells the pool of mortgages to a SPV, in return for cash.
In this "true sale" securitization, the mortgage loans disappear from the balance sheet of the bank. In order to finance its purchase of the mortgage pool, the SPV issues RMBS and sells these securities to various investors. The RMBS sold are "tranched" in specific classes according to their credit risk, such as rated by the rating agencies [Elul (2005) ; Citigroup (2007) ]. Thus, a tranche can be defined as a specific portion of a securitized portfolio of assets [Morgan Stanley (2008) ], based on a group of assets with similar credit risk characteristics. The process of tranching is shown in Figure 3 . On the basis of a pool of mortgages of €100 million, RMBS are created which consist of €96 million of investment grade securities, subdivided in tranches rated "super-senior" AAA, "senior" AA and "mezzanine" BBB, and of €4 million of below investment grade securities, with tranches rated "subordinated" B and unrated (the so-called "equity" tranche). According to their specific risk preferences, various types of investors buy specific tranches. For example, pension funds often may have a preference for the less-risky, higher-rated but lower yielding AAA or AA tranches, whereas more risk-prone investors such as hedge funds may invest in the more risky and higher yielding B or equity tranches. Thus, in the process of the creation of the RMBS, rating agencies are of enormous importance, as they rate the bank that originates the mortgage loans, the SPV that creates the RMBS and the specific tranches of the RMBS. Furthermore, in order to raise the credit quality of the RMBS tranches issued, the SPV may use credit enhancement techniques. This implies the use of certain mechanisms that elevate the credit quality of the financial instruments involved and consequently protect investors from losses incurred on the underlying assets [Standard & Poor's (2007) ]. This is attractive for the SPV, because if it can raise the rating of some part of the RMBS issued, it can lower its financing costs on this debt. For example, by using credit enhancement techniques, it may be able to issue a greater part of the RMBS tranches at investment grade level. Credit enhancement can take many forms but some common credit enhancements are over-collateralization and third-party guarantees by financial guarantors or monolines (see Figure 2 ). In the case of over-collateralization, the amount of RMBS issued is less than the amount of the underlying assets or collateral. In the case of monolines, they may guarantee that interest and principal of the RMBS issued will be paid on time and in full in the event of a default by the SPV issuing the paper. They can do this by either issuing financial guaranties (or "wraps") or by selling protection via credit default
The mortgages underlying the RMBS issues may be either of "prime" or "subprime" quality, depending on the creditworthiness of the respective borrowers, or combinations of both. The financial turmoil that started in the summer of 2007 originated in the subprime mortgage markets and affected particular those structured finance instruments that were collateralized by these assets [see Ashcraft and Schuerman (2007) ].
In order to grasp the importance of securitization at a global level, Chart 1 and 
Asset-backed commercial paper (ABCP)
Asset-backed commercial papers (ABCP) are collateralized short-term debt instruments (commercial paper or CP), which are constantly rolled over and issued by so-called conduits (which include Structured Investment Vehicles or SIVs) to finance investments in often longer-term securities [Fitch Ratings (2001); Moody's (2003) ]. These securities can be regarded as the collateral underlying the ABCP issued, in other words are the "asset-backed" component of ABCP. Figure 4 explains the basic mechanism of ABCP. Certain investors, or collateral providers which can be banks or other entities, want to obtain financing by selling certain assets to an ABCP conduit. These assets need to be "eligible", i.e. they need to have a certain rating that allows the conduits to purchase them. The ABCP conduit finances its purchase of the eligible assets by issuing ABCP, which is subsequently bought by investors in the ABCP market. In order to make the paper more attractive for the investors, Table 1 , where it is shown that mortgages were the largest single collateral category representing more than one quarter of all collateral in US ABCP programs. 2 The ABCP conduits that were hit the hardest in the turmoil have been so-called Structured Investment Vehicles or SIVs, which specialized in investing in structured finance products. An overview of these and other ABCP conduits is provided in Table 2 . Chart 3 shows that the amount outstanding of US ABCP, which is by far the main segment of the global ABCP market, started to decline rapidly in the third quarter of 2007 and that in 2008 outstanding levels remained at relatively subdued levels from a historic perspective. Can basically be anything, such as loans (including prime and sub-prime mortgages), debt securities (including bank debt, high yield bonds), assetbacked securities (RMBS, CMBS) and CDOs (CBOs, CLOs). 
Hybridconduits
Multi-seller conduits that not only invest in loans but also in securities.
Securities arbitrage conduits 15% Conduits that have been especially established to exploit arbitrage opportunities. Most often used is "maturity arbitrage" (on the term structure of credit spreads) by issuing short-term ABCP and investing the proceeds in longer-term assets. Another possible form of arbitrage is arbitrage by banks, which seek arbitrage opportunities or capital relief associated with moving assets off the balance sheet. The exposure of these conduits to mortgages and CDOs is much larger than with single and multi-seller conduits (33% respectively 26% of total collateral, endMarch 2007) Structured investment vehicles (SIVs)
6%
Conduits which invest heavily in structured finance products (such as asset-backed securities) and obtain funds by issuing ABCP and medium-term notes (MTN) and long-term capital notes. SIV funds consist between onethird to more than 50% of ABCP; on average 35% of their liabilities consist of ABCP. SIVs also conduct "maturity arbitrage" by issuing short and medium-term paper and investing the proceeds in long-term credit assets. These conduits have significant investments in asset-backed securities. For example, as of end-October 2007, according to Moody's, SIV's assets comprised of prime US RMBS (11.3% of total assets), non-US RMBS (8.6%) and CMBS (7.4%). In addition, direct exposure to nonprime US RMBS was around 5%. Thus in total, almost one-third of SIV assets was linked to mortgage-backed securities. Further important assets were bank debt securities (29.4%) and CDOs (12.1%).
CDO program conduits (SIVlites)
4%
Conduits that partly or fully finance specific CDO tranches by issuing ABCP. They operate more like CDOs than like "traditional" SIVs. There are a number of ways to classify CDOs. The main classification of CDOs is based on the specific way credit risk is being transferred, in accordance with similar practices in securitizations in general. If the SPE/SPV of a CDO owns the underlying debt obligations, the CDO is referred to as a "cash flow" or "true sale" CDO. In case the SPE/SPV does not acquire the portfolio of underlying debt instruments, but sells a credit default swap (CDS) to transfer the credit risk exposure of these instruments, the CDO is referred to as a "synthetic" CDO. In addition, some other types of CDOs exist, such as a hybrid variant combining elements of the "cash flow" and "synthetic" CDOs. These other CDOs will not be discussed in this Occasional Paper. As is shown in Chart 4, the bulk of CDOs exist of "cash flow" CDOs (including "hybrid" CDOs), with a much smaller share accounted for by "synthetic" CDOs.
Another classification of CDOs is based on the specific underlying portfolio.
Here, CDOs can be divided in collateralized loan obligations (CLOs) and collateralized bond obligations (CBOs). CLOs are CDOs completely based on the packaging in a new security of loans, such as bank loans. CBOs are similar but then based solely on bonds [Jobst (2003) ].
As is shown in Chart 5, the issuance of CDOs collateralized by loans traditionally has been much larger than that of CDOs collateralized by bonds. Furthermore, structured CDOs exist, which are CDOs that are based on collateral that exists of structured finance instruments and which will be discussed below.
Finally, CDOs can also be classified according to the aim of the transaction [Cousseran and Rahmouni (2005) ]. Balance sheet CDOs allow the originator to place certain assets off their balance sheet, allowing assets and/or credit risk to be transferred to an off-balance sheet legal entity. Arbitrage CDOs allow the originator to take advantage of spread differences between the average yields on the underlying portfolio and on the tranches issued. These CDOs will not be discussed here further in detail.
Taking into account that the classification of "cash flow" and "synthetic" CDOs is the main one, this Occasional Paper specifically will discuss them. As the former CDOs can be regarded as a form of securitization and since they are often included in statistics on asset-backed securities (see section 2), they are discussed in this section. The latter
CDOs have been included explicitly as "pure" credit derivatives and therefore are presented in section 4 on credit derivatives.
Turning now to "cash flow" CDOs in detail, these instruments allow the SPE/SPV to obtain the credit risk exposure by purchasing outstanding debt instruments and to transfer the credit risk by issuing its own collateralized financial instruments, primarily debt but could also be equity. Credit rating agencies rate the various tranches of debt issued by the SPE/SPV, depending on differences in seniority, similar to the asset-backed securities described in Figure 3 in section 3.1.
An example of a "cash flow", "true sale" CDO is presented in Figure 5 . This is a CDO based on an underlying pool of "mezzanine" tranches of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS). The "mezzanine" tranches of RMBs are usually rated BBB (see Figure 3 for an example), thus are relatively low rated. In the example, the originator creates a pool of "mezzanine" tranches from various RMBS and sells this pool to the SPV. The SPV finances its purchase of the pool by issuing a CDO in the form of "tranched" notes, which are bought by various investors. According to their risk preference, these investors buy either lower or higher-rated tranches, with corresponding higher or lower yields.
The explanation in Figure The process of creating structured CDOs is exemplified in Figure 6 . As a first securitization, based on various pools of residential mortgage loans, a number of residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) are created. Then, on the basis of a pool of "mezzanine"
3. This process has also been described as a broadening of securitization. See BIS (2008a), p. 5.
tranches derived from these RMBS, a second securitization is conducted, which is the creation of a CDO based on the pool of "mezzanine" tranches. The interesting aspect is that the rating of the tranched CDO is for 87% "super-senior" and "senior" (i.e. 75% AAA and 12% AA), thus much higher than the BBB rating of the underlying "mezzanine" tranches from the RMBS. The new CDO has also a "mezzanine" tranche, which however is only 4% of the CDO.
Thus, via "financial alchemy" of the rating agencies, a considerable part of the tranches of the CDO receives here much higher credit ratings (namely AAA and AA) than the original BBB tranche of the RMBS, linked to residential mortgages [on the inherent weaknesses of this process, see Mason and Rosner (2007a and 2007b) ; The Banker (2008)]. The main reason for this is that the correlation between the various "mezzanine" tranches is perceived to be lower than between the mortgages in the individual mortgage pools, because the "mezzanine" tranches are backed by different mortgage pools. For example, the correlation between the "mezzanine" tranche from a RMBS backed by a pool of mortgages from New York and the "mezzanine" tranche from a RMBS backed by a pool of mortgages from Alaska is perceived to be lower than the correlation between the mortgages in either the New York or Alaska mortgage pools. As a result, the debt issued by the SPE/SPV usually has a higher rating than that of the underlying or collateral debt. This has allowed institutional investors in certain countries to invest in such debt.
In Table 3 , it is shown how vulnerable in particular structured CDOs were to the US Consequently, generally it is much more complicated to assess the risk of CDOs than that of standard securitizations such as residential mortgage-backed securities. No separate servicer, trustee, underwriter and/or swap counterparty. Instead of RMBS, the underlying assets of CDOs basically can be anything, such as other asset-backed securities, bank loans (create CLOs), bonds (create CBOs), credit default swaps and even other CDOs and hybrid portfolios. 1 Typical composition of underlying assets of CDOs which invest in asset-backed securities (ABS) (so-called "ABS CDOs"). Thus, this example coincides with the example shown in Figure 5 , where the creation of a CDO was shown based on residential mortgage-backed securities (RMBS).
Credit derivatives
Generally, credit derivatives can be defined as private financial contracts under which an financial market participant buys or sells risk protection in a OTC market against the credit risk associated with a specific reference entity (or specific entities) [IMF (2007) The main types of credit default swaps are single name CDS and CDS index contracts,
whereas an important category of synthetic CDOs are so-called index tranches-based CDOs.
An overview of the development of these main credit derivatives is presented in Table 4 , which shows that CDS index contracts expanded their market share rather significantly in recent years. 
Chart 8. Buyers and sellers of credit derivatives
Protection sellers (long credit risk) Protection buyers (short credit risk)
Credit default swaps (CDS)
Credit default swaps are the most important credit derivatives and consist of two main categories, i.e. single name contracts and index contracts.
A single-name credit default swap is a bilateral, off-balance-sheet agreement between two counterparties in which one party, the protection seller or writer, offers the other party, the buyer, protection or insurance against credit risk on a specified amount of face value of bonds (the notional principal) against a credit event by a third party (reference entity, reference asset) for a specified period of time, in return for premium payments [Chacko et al. (2006) ]. For example, a bank sells protection against the default of a bond (with a notional amount of say $1,000) issued by Ford Motor Company (i.e. the third party)
to an investor who pays a premium or fee to the bank. Reference asset (A specific bond or other debt instrument)
A credit event is an event that affects materially the value of the reference asset and which triggers the termination of the CDS contract, as the insurance will have to be paid out.
4
In the absence of a credit event, the protection buyer will just pay the regular premium each quarter to the protection seller until the expiration of the CDS contract. If a credit event occurs, the buyer of protection pays the last quarterly premium in arrears to the seller. In a so-called "cash" settlement, the seller of protection makes the insurance payment to the protection buyer which consists of the notional amount of the bond (here $1,000) minus its remaining market value (see Figure 7A) . In a so-called "physical" settlement, the protection seller just pays the notional amount of the bond to the buyer, while the buyer needs to deliver the actual reference asset to the seller (for example here the bond issued by Ford Motor Company) (see Figure 7B ).
The spreads of single-name CDS contracts related to specific banks are extremely iTraxx families of corporate CDS indices (for an overview see Table 5 
"Synthetic" collateralized debt obligations (CDOs)
Similar to securitizations, in addition to "cash flow" CDOs (which were discussed in section 3.3), there also exist "synthetic" CDOs, where the SPE/SPV does not buy physically the portfolio of underlying debt instruments, but sells credit default swaps over the same debt instruments underlying the "cash flow" CDO described above. Thus, the SPE/SPV acquires the same credit risk exposure to this underlying debt without owning it, and transfers this credit risk to investors.
An example of a synthetic CDO is shown in Figure 8 (with in red the changes from the "cash flow" CDO). The originator only wants to get rid of the credit risk of the underlying pool of assets and not the physical assets themselves, in this case (similar as above) a pool of "mezzanine" tranches (rated "B") of various RMBS. The originator buys protection through a CDS contract with the SPE/SPV, which is the seller of protection and gets a CDS premium for the acquired exposure to the credit risk of the reference debt. The SPE/SPV transfers the credit exposure by issuing CDO tranches and selling it to investors (through the same process as in the "cash" CDO). With the cash it receives from its investors, SPE/SPV buys senior low risk debt (rated AAA), receives the interest of that debt (coupons) and transfers a proportion of it to the investors. If a credit event occurs to the underlying debt, the SPE/SPV sells the senior debt in order to pay the CDS protection to the originator. With the profit from the sale of this debt, the SPE/SPV also returns to the investors their principal-back payment. If the SPE/SPV lacks funds to fully repay all investors the principal amount that they invested in the tranched CDO, the order of payment follows the seniority of the tranches. Channel 1 involves the creation of subprime mortgage-backed securities by a US commercial bank, which are bought by ABCP conduits, for example a SIV belonging to a German bank. The example of a German bank has been chosen as a number of German banks, such as IKB and Sachsen Landesbank, were particularly affected by the turmoil in this way. When due to the subprime crisis the value of these assets declined substantially, the collateral values of the SIV eroded, resulting in major refinancing difficulties.
In a similar fashion, Channel 2 shows the creation of "cash flow" CDOs by a US investment bank which are collateralized by residential mortgage loans that also are bought by the SIV of the German bank. Also here, the collapse of the price of these instruments created major problems and losses for the SIV.
Channel 3 involves the creation of the same CDOs as in Channel 2, but now the US investment bank needs to absorb these instruments on its balance sheet. Namely, the financial turmoil eroded completely investor confidence in CDOs and banks were no longer able to sell these instruments to investors. As a result, some SPVs of banks became saddled with CDOs as they could not get rid of them, forcing their sponsoring banks to absorb these instruments. Merrill Lynch has been one of the (investment) banks hit in particular through this channel [see for example The New Yorker (2008)].
Channel 4 is a channel more directly linked to the banks and their ABCP conduits.
Numerous banks used these conduits here the SIV belonging to a German bank to put specific assets off their balance sheet and/or to absorb debt securities that they issued.
Some of these assets proved to be relatively risky when the financial turmoil evolved, generating losses for the SIV. Moreover, when the crisis of confidence in financial markets hit the banking sector, also the debt securities issued by the sponsoring bank that the SIV purchased dropped in value.
Channel 5 is related to the previous channels and essentially involves the absorption of the impaired assets from the ABCP conduits by the sponsoring banks, again here by the German bank that owns the SIV. Ultimately, the problems spilled over to the banks arising from the fact that they had to bail out their SIVs, for example by taking over the impaired assets which had declined significantly in value, a process that resulted in major write-downs and losses for the banks involved. Some banks that have been hit via this channel are HSBC, Citigroup and WestLB.
Finally, Channel 6 is also related to the first four channels and consists of the process that the liquidity facilitating banks actually needed to provide liquidity support to the ABCP conduits. As the ABCP issued by the conduits is of very short maturity, they almost constantly are in need of new funding. Thus, when a crisis hits and no investor wants to buy ABCP, almost immediately conduits face major funding problems and need to sell their assets and/or need to obtain liquidity support from the liquidity facilitating banks. Of course, in a collapsing market, it is very difficult to sell assets or only at a substantial loss, so in fact many SIVs had no choice than to recourse primarily to liquidity support when the subprime crisis hit the market. This resulted in major liquidity strains for the banks involved, as they had not anticipated that they would have to provide such large amounts of liquidity and consequently the process resulted in considerable disarray in interbank markets.
We want to conclude this Occasional Paper with a short discussion of the role of the rating agencies in structured finance and the financial turmoil. Although this aspect can only be touched upon briefly, it is highly important to understand some of the mechanisms Channel 2: Creation of CDOs.
US investment bank
Collateralized Debt Obligations (CDOs)
German bank
Channel 3: US investment bank needs to absorb unsold CDO's on its balance sheet. Table 5 All names in these indices are equally weighted and contracts with 3, 5, 7 and 10 year maturities are available. Recently, three new different types of CDS index contracts have appeared which belong to the CDX and iTraxx families, but which are different in terms of the underlying debt (see Table 5 ). The CDX.EM index is based on CDS contracts with as underlying debt instruments the sovereign bonds issued by 14 emerging market economies, while the CDX.EM. "diversified" index comprises exposure to 20 CDS of both sovereign and corporate debt instruments of emerging market economies. The LCDX and LevX indexes track CDS over a pool of respectively 100 and 35 specific leveraged loans in North America and Europe. The emergence of structured products has resulted in the introduction of related CDS index contracts in North America, which are the ABX.HE, TABX and CMBX index contracts (see Table 5 ). Number of reference entities in bracket brackets SOURCE: Markit and own elaboration.
